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The Political Affiliations of Iranian Newspapers
Abstract
The complexities of the Iranian media ecosystem become most apparent during the election season when the
heightened political climate leads to intensified scrutiny to and reliance on print media. In the absence of
political parties, the press serves as a valuable tool during election campaigns, and this report highlights the
shifting allegiances in national publications with a focus on politics, economics, and society. Newspapers are
divided by faction (Pro-government Conservative, Traditional Conservative, Critical-of-the-Government
Conservative, Affiliated with Reformists, and Reformist), and labeled with their 2009 political affiliations,
their expected affiliations for 2013, and their stance on reformists. Once the Guardian Council releases the
final vetted candidates on May 24th, these newspapers will become active in supporting their preferred
factions or candidates.
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1The Political Affiliations of Iranian Newspapers
Complexities of the Iranian Media Ecosystem
The complexities of the Iranian media ecosystem become most apparent during the election sea-
son when the heightened politicization of newspapers leads to intensified attention paid to print 
media. In the absence of political parties, the press serves as a valuable tool during election cam- 
paigns, supporting the legitimacy of the Islamic state or, alternatively, as a forum for political dissent 
and challenges to state legitimacy by opposition groups.
During the 2013 presidential election cycle, officials summoned the managing directors of Iran’s 
publications to remind them of the “red lines” (off-limits topics) of election coverage. Newspa-
pers were warned that any attempt to accentuate debates about the electoral process would be 
confronted with a heavy hand. The delineation of “red lines” allows the authorities to control media 
content and censor dissenting views while co-opting the platform to legitimize the elections.  This 
heightened control of media content has not been well received by Iranian readers, lowering circu-
lation. 
Pedram Pak Ayin, director of the Department of National Press and News Agencies at the Min-
istry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, stated that although the number of newspapers in Iran is 
high, the number of printed copies of all newspapers in daily circulation is less than 2 million. This 
number stands in stark contrast to the reformist era (1997-2005), when censorship of print media 
was comparatively relaxed. Journalists working during that era estimate more than 1 million copies 
of a single newspaper were available for readers.  While an increase in digital media use remains an 
obvious explanation for this shift in both supply and demand for print media, it can also be attribut-
ed to increased censorship and lack of open debate about the elections in the press.
Newspapers have been effective campaign tools for candidates in past elections, such as in the 
1997 presidential elections, when the contest between Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri (endorsed by the 
Supreme Leader) and reformist Mohammad Khatami (a candidate who represented those margin-
alized after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini) found its most potent debates within newspapers. 
During this time, Salam was the only pro-Khatami newspaper, while the majority of newspapers 
supported Nategh-Nouri. Even newspapers that were not legally allowed to put forth direct sup-
port of a candidate (due to government funding) ignored such regulations.
Journalist and editor of Salam’s financial reporting Abbas Abdi believed demand for Salam’s read-
ership doubled its printed copies during this timeframe,  and that one issue of Salam was read by 
at least three people during the height of the election season. While conservative-leaning Ham-
2shahri newspaper had a readership and distribution numbers that dwarfed Salam’s, Abdi argued 
that most Hamshahri readers just scanned the publication for headlines and did not care for the 
newspaper’s political leanings. On the other hand, Abdi cited surveys demonstrating that more 
than 50 percent of Salam readers thoroughly read each article, leading to a powerful impact on 
their political outlooks. The newspaper’s influence finally caught the ire of the Ministry of Intelli-
gence and was closed down in 1999 for the crime of reporting on internal government matters.
Despite increasing censorship pressures on newspapers during the 2005 and 2009 elections 
coupled with declining readership, newspapers remain an important tool in politics. The nature of 
print media continues to evolve as shifts in the country’s political factions since 2009 have rippled 
into the political affiliations of newspapers. Specifically, conservatives divided into three groups: 
pro-government conservatives, traditional conservatives, and critical-of-the-government conser-
vatives. Even within these groups there are divisions: Pro-government conservatives supported 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during his first term as president; during Ahmadinejad’s second term, the 
faction became divided between those who supported Ahmadinejad and his Chief of Staff, Esfandi-
ar Rahim Mashaei (pro-Ahmadinejad and pro-Mashaei conservatives), and those who supported 
Ahmadinejad but not Mashaei (pro-Ahmadinejad conservatives). Support for the Supreme Leader 
Ali Khamenei remains a commonality between conservatives, but this commonality is increasingly 
splintered, as demonstrated by recent conflicts between parliament, Ahmadinejad’s government, 
and the judiciary. Newspapers that supported Ahmadinejad in 2009, such as Resalat, are now 
among the newspapers very critical of him, and the print media’s political affiliations continue on 
the trajectory of becoming increasingly fractured. The reformists also experienced fracturing, 
albeit not as stark as among the conservative groups. Media outlets, such as Arman newspaper, are 
less explicit in their stance toward reformists, and are commonly referred to as organs  “close to 
reformists.” Other papers, such as Shargh,  are more overt in their affiliations, and are treated as 
“reformist” in this report.
This report was compiled as an information report, rather than an analytical piece. We endeavour 
to highlight the shifting allegiances of print media and examine national publications with a focus on 
politics, economics, and society. Newspapers are divided by faction (Pro-government Conservative, 
Traditional Conservative, Critical-of-the-Government Conservative, Affiliated with Reformists, and 
Reformist), and labeled with their 2009 political affiliations, their expected affiliations for 2013, and 
their stance on reformists. Once the Guardian Council releases the final vetted candidates on May 
24th, these newspapers will become active in supporting their preferred factions or candidates. 
3Pro-Government Conservative
Iran
Supported in 2009: Ahmadinejad.
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely support Ahmadinejad’s endorsed
candidate Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei.
Stance on reformist participation: Opposed.
Iran is owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran News Agency (IRNA) and is currently managed by 
Mosayeb Naeemi. Iran has served the present and past two administrations of Akbar Hashemi Raf-
sanjani and Mohammad Khatami through an emphasis on the government’s news, with very limited 
coverage of other factions.
During the presidency of Ahmadinejad, however, Iran moved beyond government support; Iran 
supports not only Ahmadinejad, but also his larger camp, including presidential hopeful Esfandiar 
Rahim Mashaei. In addition, Iran publishes harshly critical pieces about the Parliament, judiciary, 
and other organizations formed and run under Khamenei’s supervision. This has resulted in the 
arrest and one-year conviction of Iran’s manager, Naeemi. 
Iran also has an affiliated website called Iran Network which is tasked with attacking those critical 
of the government such as Khamenei’s representative in the IRGC Ali Saeedi and the IRGC’s polit-
ical deputy Rasul Sanai Rad. According to Iran Network, those associated with Iran’s military have 
attacked and criticized the government with the pretense of protecting the nation from threats 
from the United States. They have accused Fars, Tasnim, Daneshjoo, Nasim, Mashregh, and Borhan 
of using government funds to launch and run multiple news agencies in an attempt to dominate the 
media sector and undermine the government. 
4Khorshid
Supported in 2009: Ahmadinejad.
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely support Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, 
or a candidate supported and approved by Ahmadinejad.
Stance on reformist participation: Opposed.
Khorshid belongs to the Social Security Organization, and is one of Iran’s highly funded news orga-
nizations. Saeed Mortazavi, well known for closing down multiple newspapers when he served as 
Tehran’s prosecutor, manages this newspaper. Khorshid has chosen the Ahmadinejad group’s motto, 
“Long live the spring,” as its main headline on several occasions.
Emtiaz
Supported in 2009: Was not in publication in 2009.
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely support a candidate from 
the Ahmadinejad and Mashaei faction.
Stance on reformist participation: Unknown.
The owner and editor-in-Chief of Emtiaz is Gholam Hossein Shabani, who publicly supports Ah-
madinejad. 
5Javan
Supported in 2009: Ahmadinejad.
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely support a candidate who is endorsed  
by the IRGC and the Supreme Leader.
Stance on reformist participation: Opposed.
Javan is affiliated with the IRGC and is currently managed by Mohammad Vodood Heidari, an 
official from Basij University. Javan supports Ahmadinejad, but not Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei. 
Javan has written that since late 2011, Ahmadinejad has generated suspicions over the validity of 
the election process, through outspoken criticisms of the June 2013 elections. According to Javan, 
this campaign to undermine the system was undertaken because Ahmadinejad remains doubtful 
that his candidate, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, will be approved by the Guardian Council. Javan 
has also criticized Ahmadinejad for disturbing public opinion about the election process and the 
organizations involved for the sake of one potential candidate, adding that “during the past 34 
years, no one has ever heard Ahmadinejad raise doubts over the election process or criticize the 
Guardian Council for disapproving certain individuals.” 
Javan managers have claimed their efforts to confront the Green Movement and suppress 
post-election protests in 2009 were a “Jihad and a revolutionary act.” As such, Javan’s official 
mandate remains to confront reformists and to collaborate with security and military organizations 
to suppress unrest and protests.
6Vatan Emrooz
Supported in 2009: Ahmadinejad.
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely support a candidate 
representing the Paydari Front.
Stance on reformist participation: Opposed.
Mehrdad Bazrpash, a former Ahmadinejad supporter (no longer in contact due to disagreements) 
and the head of the National Youth Organization, owns Vatan Emrooz. During the past few years, 
the newspaper has maintained close ties with the Paydari Front political party, established by 
a group of former Ahmadinejad cabinet ministers, including Iran’s billionaire minister Sadegh 
Mahsouli, alongside a group of IRGC businessmen who are supported by the conservative cleric 
Mesbah Yazdi. So far the newspaper has remained silent about whether it will support a candidate 
endorsed by Ahmadinejad.
Eghtesad Pooya
Supported in 2009: 
Did not take a position.
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely support a candidate from the 
Ahmadinejad and Mashaei faction. 
Stance on reformist participation: Opposed.
Eghtesad Pooya is a business newspaper that supports Ahmadinejad and Mashaei. Eghtesad 
Pooya began as a provincial newspaper published in Golestan province and is now published 
nationwide by editor-in-Chief Habibollah Gholish Lee. It is known as the “business bulletin of Ah-
madinejad’s government,” providing a platform of praise for Ahmadinejad’s economic and financial 
policies. 
7Farheekhtegan
Supported in 2009: 
Ahmadinejad; partially supported Mir Hossein Mousavi
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely support a candidate who is supported
and approved by Ahmadinejad and the Paydari Front.
Stance on reformist participation: Opposed.
Farheekhtegan is owned by the Islamic Azad University. During Ahmadinejad’s first term as pres-
ident, he often criticized and attacked the former President of Islamic Azad University, Abdollah 
Jasbi. As a result, Farheekhtegan did not support Ahmadinejad during the 2009 election while 
they never publicly supported the other three presidential candidates. The newspaper even em-
ployed several reformist journalists who were arrested shortly after the 2009 elections for their 
coverage while working for the newspaper. 
While Abdollah Jasbi was the university president, Farheekhtegan was close to Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani. When Jasbi was dismissed in 2010, however, Farhad Daneshjoo, the head of the elec-
tion department at the Ministry of Interior during the 2009 election, was instated as the universi-
ty’s new president, with the addition of a new editor-in-Chief, Hamid Reza Abedi-Khorsandi. These 
appointments were made with Khamenei’s support.
Under Abedi-Khorsandi’s management, Farheekhtegan has changed its political position to sup-
port the Ahmadinejad government. It is likely that Farheekhtegan will support a representative of 
the Paydari Front or a candidate approved and supported by Ahmadinejad.
Afarinesh is another newspaper affiliated with the Islamic Azad University that has undergone 
similar changes during the past few years.
8Tamasha
Supported in 2009: 
N/A (newspaper was founded in 2010).
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely support a candidate from 
the Ahmadinejad and Mashaei faction.
Stance on reformist participation: Opposed.
Ertebat Baran Pooya Art and Culture Institute owns Tamasha, a publication launched in 2010, with 
Esmaeil Ramezani as the editor-in-Chief. Tamasha, which covers sports, cultural and social topics, is 
thought to be affiliated with the Ahmadinejad and Mashaei team. 
Haft Sobh
Supported in 2009: Ahmadinejad.
Expected to support in 2013: 
Not clear what their stance is.
Stance on reformist participation: 
Partial Support.
Haft Sobh is a Qom-based national newspaper, owned by Ertebat Baran Pooya Art and Culture In-
stitute and run by editor-in-Chief Ali Mazinani. Although Haft Sobh supports the Ahmadinejad and 
Mashaei faction, the paper attempts to hide this fact. In order to avoid censorship from traditional 
conservatives opposed to Ahmadinejad it has hired a number of reformist journalists to hide its 
direct support for the president. 
9Rah Mardom
Supported in 2009: 
Not a national newspaper, dealt with local issues.
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely support a candidate from the 
Ahmadinejad and Mashaei faction.
Stance on reformist participation: Unknown.
Rah Mardom is based in Kerman but distributes a limited number of copies across the country. It 
is affiliated with Ahmadinejad and Mashaei. Naser Ghadiri serves as editor-in-Chief.
Siasat Rooz
Supported in 2009: Ahmadinejad. 
Expected to support in 2013: They will likely support a candidate representing  
the coalition of conservatives. 
Stance on reformist participation: Opposed.
The editor-in-Chief of Siasat Rooz is Member of Parliament Ali Yousefpour, a former IRGC 
member and member of the Society of Devotees of the Islamic Revolution, which supported 
Ahmadinejad during the 2005 and 2009 elections. Siasat Rooz’s editorial line indicates that it 
supports only Ahmadinejad and not Mashaei.
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Traditional Conservative
Resalat
Supported in 2009: Ahmadinejad.
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely support a candidate 
representing the coalition of conservatives. 
Stance on reformist participation: Opposed.
Resalat is owned by the Resalat Foundation, the editor-in-Chief is Morteza Nabavi, a well-known 
conservative figure and also a member of the Expediency Discernment Council of the System 
(a position appointed directly by the Supreme Leader). Another Resalat editor is Mohammad Ka-
zem Anbarlooyi, a member of the Islamic Coalition Party.
Resalat represents traditional conservatives such as the Islamic Coalition Party, Society of Semi-
nary Teachers of Qom, Islamic Society of Engineers, and the Society of the Islamic Associations of 
Tehran’s Guilds and Bazaar. During the 2005 election, Resalat initially supported Ali Larijani, but 
quickly moved to support Ahmadinejad, an endorsement that continued through the 2009 elec-
tion. Since 2010, the newspaper has been divided between the Supreme Leader and Ahmadinejad. 
They have found a middle ground in supporting the President (not for re-election, but as a politi-
cian with credibility), but not supporting his endorsement of Mashaei.
Resalat is strongly opposed to reformists. The newspaper supported the suppression of the Green 
Movement in 2009 and supports the house arrests of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. It 
appears that Resalat is against the notion of free elections. According to Resalat writers, reformists 
should be stopped from participation in the election.
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Kayhan
Supported in 2009: Ahmadinejad.
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely support a conservative candidate 
who is approved by the Supreme Leader.
Stance on reformist participation: Opposed.
Kayhan was a pre-revolutionary media institution, reshaped into a mouthpiece for the office of 
the Supreme Leader during the Islamic Revolution.  Hossein Shariatmadari, directly appointed by 
Khamenei, manages the newspaper. Shariatmadari is associated with Iran’s intelligence services and 
is a former IRGC official. Kayhan is also recognized as a security organization in charge of building 
cases against the opposition and those critical of the regime inside the country and abroad. Kayhan 
maintains close ties with security and judiciary officials and organizations and is considered to be 
one of the most influential newspapers in Iran. 
During the reformist era, Kayhan was opposed to the government; however, it supported the Ah-
madinejad government until 2011, after which conflicts between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei arose 
over the dismissal of Minister of Intelligence and National Security Heidar Moslehi. Since then, Kay-
han has made efforts to maintain its previous editorial line of support for Ahmadinejad, in order to 
maintain the patterns of public endorsement displayed between 2005 and 2011. However, Kayhan 
does not support Ahmadinejad’s presidential hopeful Mashaei.
During the past few months, Kayhan has supported current Mayor of Tehran and former hardline 
police chief Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, responsible for squashing the student protests of 1999 
and 2005. Ghalibaf is expected to register his name for the Presidency alongside Gholam Ali Hadd-
ad-Adel and Ali Akbar Velayati (also known as the 2+1 coalition).  
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Jam-e Jam
Supported in 2009: 
Ahmadinejad.
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely support a candidate approved by the 
ruling regime, excluding Ahmadinejad and Mashaei.
Stance on reformist participation: Opposed. 
Jam-e Jam is affiliated with Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), which has complete con-
trol over radio and television in Iran. (The head of IRIB, Ezzatollah Zarghami, is appointed by the 
Supreme Leader.) Bijan Moghaddam, a journalist who worked previously with Resalat and was the 
former editor-in-Chief of Fars News Agency, is now the editor-in-Chief of Jam-e Jam. Jam-e Jam 
maintains close ties with the Society of Devotees to the Islamic Revolution, and supported Ah-
madinejad in 2009. In 2013, however, Jam-e Jam will likely support a candidate from the ruling fac-
tion, unrelated to Ahmadinejad and Mashaei. The newspaper was opposed to Mir Hossein Mousavi 
and Mehdi Karroubi and supported their house arrest. 
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Khorasan
Supported in 2009: 
They indirectly supported Ahmadinejad; however, 
their main political aim was to encourage
participation in the elections.
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely support a conservative candidate 
approved by the Society of Seminary Teachers of 
Qom and the Combatant Clergy Association.
Stance on reformist participation: Neutral.
Khorasan has been in print for about 60 years and is headquartered in Mashdad, but distributed 
nationwide. The newspaper was acquired by the government after the Islamic Revolution and since 
2000, has worked under the supervision of the Supreme Leader’s Office. A five-member board of 
trustees close to traditional conservatives manages the newspaper. The current director of Kho-
rasan is Kourosh Shojaei Boorabad and the editor-in-Chief is Mohammad Saeed Ahadian. In 2009, 
Khorasan encouraged participation in the elections, defended the integrity of the regime, and 
supported the governing system of the Islamic regime. Although Khorasan published news about 
all four presidential candidates in 2009, it supported the suppressions and arrests following the 
election. Khorasan is slated to support a candidate representing the majority of traditional con-
servatives, who is also approved by the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom and the Combatant 
Clergy Association.
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Quds
Supported in 2009: Ahmadinejad.
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely support a candidate 
endorsed by the Supreme Leader.
Stance on reformist participation: Neutral.
Quds is part of Astan Quds Razavi, a charity foundation in Mashhad that administers the Imam 
Reza Shrine. The Supreme Leader appointed the head of Astan Quds, Abbas Vaez Tabasi and the 
managing director is Gholamreza Ghalandarian. The newspaper is based in Mashhad but distribut-
ed nationally. Quds maintains a conservatively-oriented content and publicly supports the Supreme 
Leader’s decisions. For the 2013 election it will support a candidate that represents a majority of 
the governing conservatives, excluding the Ahmadinejad faction. 
Abrar
Supported in 2009: 
N/A (has not supported a presidential  
candidate since the 1997 elections)
Expected to support in 2013: 
Will not take a side.
Stance on reformist participation:
Will not take a side.
Mohammad Safizadeh, a former deputy at the Ministry of Interior throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
holds the license for the Abrar publication group, which includes Abrar (news), Abrar-e Vazeshi 
(sports), and Abrar-e Eghtesadi (business). Abrar supported Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri during the 
presidential election in 1997, but since then, the newspaper has not taken sides in the elections.  
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Hemayat
Supported in 2009: Ahmadinejad.
Expected to support in 2013: N/A 
Stance on reformist participation: N/A
Hemayat is the organizational newspaper of the State Prisons Security and Corrective Measures 
Organization, affiliated with the judiciary. The current managing director of Hemayat is Ali Shams. 
Hemayat is the judiciary’s official media outlet and will reflect the position of judiciary officials re-
garding the upcoming election –typically in favor of the conservative faction. This newspaper is not 
particularly political in its writing, but chose to support Ahmadinejad as the conservative candidate 
in 2009. They are not expected to hold a position on the 2013 presidential candidates, given the 
large number of conservative candidates expected to participate. 
Critical-of-the-Government Conservative 
Hamshahri 
Supported in 2009: Did not take a position. 
Expected to support in 2013: They will likely 
support Ghalibaf or a candidate endorsed by 
the Supreme Leader. 
Stance on reformist participation: Not entirely opposed.
The municipality of Tehran holds the license of Hamshahri; therefore, the mayor of Tehran appoints 
the managers of the publication and it is the most widely distributed publication in Iran. Hamshahri 
was launched when Gholamhossein Karbaschi was the mayor of Tehran and maintained close ties 
with Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. This relationship ended when Ahmadinejad became mayor of 
Tehran. 
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When Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf became mayor in 2005, the managing staff of Hamshahri once 
again changed, with a number of reformist journalists joining the newspaper. During Ghalibaf’s term 
as mayor, the Hamshahri publication group greatly expanded through weekly and monthly maga-
zines, including Hamshahri Javan (youth audiences), Hamshahri Tandorosti (health and medicine), 
Hamshahri Memari (architecture and urban planning), and Hamshahri Tamashagar (TV and cine-
ma). 
In 1997 and 2001 Hamshahri indirectly supported Khatami’s candidacy, and in 2005 it publicly 
supported Ahmadinejad. The newspaper avoided taking positions during the 2009 election. Since 
2005, due to increasing conflicts between Ahmadinejad and Ghalibaf, Hamshahri has continuously 
criticized Ahmadinejad’s socioeconomic policies. Hamshahri has recently intensified its criticisms 
of Ahmadinejad, on one occasion for “wasting over 521 billion dollars of profit from the oil industry.” 
These reports have started a new round of media battles between Hamshahri and various govern-
ment-leaning newspapers.
Hamshahri is likely to support Ghalibaf, if he runs, or a candidate approved by him. The newspaper 
will not support members of the Ahmadinejad camp. Hamshahri has indicated that reformists must 
distance themselves from the views and support of the 2009 protesters if they want to have a role 
in the upcoming election.
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Jomhouri Eslami
Supported in 2009: Opposed Ahmadinejad.
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely support Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, 
if he runs, or a moderate candidate close to Rafsanjani. 
Stance on reformist participation: 
Will only support the participation of 
reformists with a weak candidate. 
Jomhouri Eslami was launched as a newspaper for the Islamic Republic Party in 1979, with Ali 
Khamenei as manager until his presidency in 1981. The Islamic Republic Party also appointed Mir 
Hossein Mousavi as editor-in-Chief until he became Minister of Foreign Affairs, and, in 1981, Prime 
Minister.
Khamenei still holds the publication license for Jomhouri Eslami. Masih Mohajeri, an old member 
of the Islamic Republic Party, is the directing manager and the editor-in-Chief. Mohajeri maintains 
close ties with Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
The newspaper was opposed to reformists during the reformist era, and supported Rafsanjani 
during the 2005 elections. It has been critical of Ahmadinejad since his presidency and has pub-
lished several critical pieces about the relationship between Ahmadinejad and his close adviser, 
Mesbah Yazdi. The newspaper has often written that the two are trying to exclude established 
clerics from the political scene. 
Jomhouri Eslami did not publicly support a candidate during the 2009 election, but was opposed 
to Ahmadinejad and his second term as president. It is unlikely Jomhouri Eslami will support 
Ahmadinejad or Mashaei in 2013. This paper will likely support Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani if he is 
vetted; otherwise, it will support a moderate candidate or someone close to Rafsanjani.
Although Jomhouri Eslami is greatly committed to the Supreme Leader, it is against the interfer-
ence of organizations such as the IRGC or the IRIB in the elections. This newspaper will likely 
only support the participation of reformists with a weak candidate, and would likely support their 
coalition with a moderate conservative figure.
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Tehran Emrooz
Supported in 2009: 
Supported Mohsen Rezaei; remained neutral toward reformists.
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely support Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf 
or a conservative outside of the Ahmadinejad camp.
Stance on reformist participation: 
Opposed to participation of reformists with their top candidate. 
Tehran Emrooz is affiliated with the Islamic Development Organization. Simaye Mehr Hasti Art and 
Cultural Institute holds the newspaper’s license and Majid Rafiyi is the managing director.
Tehran Emrooz is affiliated with critical-of-the-government conservatives; it is close to Ali Larijani, 
Ahmad Tavakkoli and Mohsen Rezaei. It is also known as a political mouthpiece for Tehran’s mayor 
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who uses Tehran Emrooz to discuss his political viewpoints in a com-
paratively more direct fashion than those presented in Hamshahri.
Tehran Emrooz was launched after Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005. The newspaper has maintained 
a conservative tone and been critical of the government. It was one of the few newspapers that 
discussed Ahmadinejad’s financial fraud cases in 2007 and 2008, culminating in the newspaper’s 
closure in 2008, after publishing an extensive critical piece of the President entitled “Being Poor in 
a Prosperous Era.” Publication was resumed after seven months and in 2009, Tehran Emrooz sup-
ported Mohsen Rezaei and remained neutral towards Karroubi and Mousavi. During the post-elec-
tion unrest, however, Tehran Emrooz supported protest suppression.
For the 2013 elections, this newspaper will support Ghalibaf or a candidate approved and support-
ed by him and critical-of-the-government conservatives. Tehran Emrooz is opposed to both Ah-
madinejad and Mashaei as well as reformist participation with their top candidate.
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Mellate Ma
Supported in 2009: Mohsen Rezaei.
Expected to support in 2013: They will likely  
support Mohsen Rezaei again or his favored candidate. 
Stance on reformist participation: 
Opposed to participation of reformists with their top candidate. 
Mohsen Rezaei, former commander of the IRGC and general secretary of Expediency Discernment 
Council of the System, holds the newspaper’s license. Rezaei ran as a conservative candidate in the 
2009 presidential elections. Mellate Ma reflects Rezaei’s opinion and interests and that of his close 
confidants. The newspaper often criticizes the economic and strategic decisions of the govern-
ment, but stays away from criticizing the government’s foreign policies.
Mellate Ma will support Mohsen Rezaei or his endorsed candidate in the upcoming election. Its 
editorial tone indicates hope that the Ahmadinejad camp will be eliminated from the ruling faction.
Maghreb
Supported in 2009: Mohsen Rezaei.
Expected to support in 2013 election: N/A 
Stance on reformist participation: Inconsistent.
Mardom Foundation is the license holder of Maghreb, a party created in 2009 supporting Mohsen 
Rezaei with Mehdi Emami Naseri as the managing director. Naseri was briefly arrested in 2012 over 
“non-political and non-financial charges.” In February 2013, Naseri and Maghreb’s politics editor Ali 
Reza Aghaeirad were detained over an article criticizing the President. The newspaper is currently 
out of distribution due to low readership and financial difficulties.
Maghreb has attempted to present itself as a reformist newspaper, but inconsistently, as it has 
pledged support to Saeed Mortazavi, the former prosecutor of the Islamic Revolutionary Court 
and former Prosecutor General of Tehran, who was responsible for the closure of several reform-
ist newspapers and the arrest of many reformist journalists. The newspaper had previously been 
affiliated with Mohsen Rezaei, but it is not presently associated with any faction.
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Ghanoon 
Supported in 2009: N/A
Expected to support in 2013: 
They most likely oppose the Ahmadinejad 
faction and maintain a strong allegiance 
to Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi.
Stance on reformist participation: Neutral.
Ghanoon’s license is held by Sepideh Taban Art and Culture Center with Mahnaz Mazaheri as its 
managing director. The first copy of Ghanoon was published in October 2012, about three months 
after the online version was launched. According to the managers of Ghanoon, the newspaper is 
independent and committed to the constitution and religious and national values of Iranians. The 
newspaper’s mandate states: “Journalists and staff working with this newspaper are associated with 
both reformist and conservative factions, and some of them might not even believe in any of the 
political factions, but all of them work within the legal structures of the regime.”
Ghanoon criticizes the current government’s socioeconomic decisions and maintains close ties 
and maintains close ties with Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi, formerly a contender for the presidency 
(he did not register). Pour-Mohammadi is well known for his role as prosecutor of the revolution-
ary courts during the 1988 massacre of Iranian prisoners. Under the Rafsanjani presidency he was 
deputy minister of intelligence, and later became interior minister during Ahmadinejad’s first term. 
Soon after his dismissal from Ahmadinejad’s cabinet, however, he became critical of the govern-
ment. He is now the head of the National Inspection Organization.
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Ettelaat
Supported in 2009: Mir Hossein Mousavi
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely remain publicly neutral, but 
will indirectly support Akbar Hashemi  
Rafsanjani if he runs. 
Stance on reformist participation: 
Unofficially supports reformists. 
Owned by Ettelaat Publication, this newspaper was in circulation prior to the Islamic Revolution. 
Mahmoud Doaei, a cleric close to Ayatollah Khomeini, took over the newspaper in 1979, acting as 
the managing director of Ettelaat and its affiliated publications.
Doaei now manages Ettelaat as Ayatollah Khamenei’s representative. He is known as a traditional 
reformist cleric who supported Mir Hossein Mousavi during the 2009 election, although during the 
election Ettelaat did not publicly endorse any candidate and neutrally covered all four candidates. 
Following the elections, government associated media unsuccessfully requested Doaei’s dismissal. 
Similar to Kayhan, Ettelaat is managed by a Khamenei representative. Ettelaat has a higher number 
of copies in circulation than Kayhan, but it does not wield as much influence over the media and 
political environment of the country.
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Etedal
Supported in 2009: N/A
Expected to support in 2013: N/A 
Stance on reformist participation: 
Against anyone who will agitate the status quo.
Reza Saberi Khorzooghi is the license holder and managing director of Etedal daily newspaper. 
Etedal primarily covers news about clerics, marjas and religious events. Etedal’s main mission is to 
publish Khamenei statements and to represent him as a holy religious figure to Iranians. This news-
paper has limited influence on Iranian politics but is unaffiliated with reformists.
Ebtekar
Supported in 2009: Opposed to Ahmadinejad.
Expected to support in 2013: 
Unknown, though they are not supportive 
of the Ahmadinejad faction. 
Stance on reformist participation: 
Will likely support a candidate such as 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
Mohammad Ali Vakili is the license holder and managing director of Ebtekar. Ebtekar is critical 
of the government, but unrelated to reformists. During the 2009 elections, Ebtekar focused its 
coverage on the rivalry between Mousavi and Ahmadinejad. Ebtekar has not clarified whether it 
will support a particular candidate in 2013, but it is expected that its disapproving tone toward the 
Ahmadinejad faction will continue.
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Close to Reformists
Mardomsalari
Supported in 2009: 
Supported Mir Hossein Mousavi.
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely support Mostafa Kavakebian, 
or Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani if they 
become candidates. 
Stance on reformist participation: Supports.
The Mardomsalari party, formed during the reformist era, newspaper’s license holder. Mostafa 
Kavakebian, leader of the party and potential 2013 presidential candidate, is the managing director. 
Mardomsalari is critical of the Ahmadinejad government, leaning toward moderate reformists and 
critical-of-the-government conservatives. During the 2009 election, Mardomsalari openly support-
ed Mousavi and opposed the election results and the protest suppression. However, Mardomsalari 
stopped publishing news related to Mousavi and Karroubi after authorities instituted aggressive 
guidelines during post-election unrest. Mardomsalari will support Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in the 
upcoming election. If Rafsanjani does not get clearance to run, they will support another reformist 
candidate.
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Arman
Supported in 2009: Mir Hossein Mousavi.
Expected to support in 2013: They will likely 
support Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. 
Stance on reformist participation: Supports.
Hooshmand Sefidi is the Arman’s license holder and Hossein Abdollahi is the editor-in-Chief. Arman 
is closely tied to Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and its editorial line advocates for his run as president.
Arman is largely critical of Ahmadinejad’s government, but refrains from publishing critical pieces 
about the ruling faction, the parliament, judiciary and organizations under Khamenei’s supervision. 
However, this editorial policy exists due to current conditions of conservatism within the govern-
ment and clerical classes. Arman considers Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as a “perfect candidate.”
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Aftab Yazd
Supported in 2009: Mehdi Karroubi.
Expected to support in 2013: 
Reformist candidate Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. 
Stance on reformist participation: Supports.
Initially a provincial newspaper published in Yazd, Aftab later became a national publication with 
Mojtaba Vahedi as its chief editor. Its license holder is Mansour Mozafari. The newspaper maintains 
ties to the Association of Combatant Clerics, and is close to reformists Mehdi Karroubi, having 
supported Karroubi during the 2005 elections, while the majority of other reformist newspapers 
supported Mostafa Moein and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. In 2009, the newspaper supported Kar-
roubi again, even though Mousavi was the top reformist candidate.
Following the arrests of Karroubi and Mousavi during the post-election unrest, Vahedi fled the 
country and worked as Karroubi’s consultant from abroad, resigning in 2011. Aftab Yazd remains 
critical of the government and often reports on the positions of moderate clerics in the reformist 
and conservative factions.
Donya-e Eqtesad
Supported in 2009: Did not take a position.
Expected to support in 2013: Will likely support 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
Stance on reformist participation: Supports.
Ali Reza Bakhtiari is the managing director of the business newspaper Donya-e Eqtesad. It has the 
largest national circulation and supports a free economy. Although it covers news with political 
themes from all factions, it is closely tied to the Kargozaran Sazandegi party, well known for their 
support of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Donya-e Eqtesad did not support any particular candidate 
during the 2009 election, but vaguely emphasized a candidate who is “in Iran’s best interests”.
26
Jahan-e Sanat
Supported in 2009: N/A
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely oppose the Ahmadinejad camp. 
Stance on reformist participation: Supports. 
Mohammad Reza Saadi is the license holder and managing director of Jahan-e Sanat. This newspa-
per is critical of Ahmadinejad’s economic policies, and holds political, social and cultural positions 
that are closer to reformists. However, it did not support Mousavi and Karroubi during the 2009 
election. It appears that Jahan-e Sanat opposes Ahmadinejad’s camp and their participation in the 
upcoming election; however, it has not specified support for any other candidates.
Kar va Kargar
Supported in 2009: Mir Hossein Mousavi.
Expected to support in 2013: They will likely support 
either a reformist or a conservative candidate  
critical of the government.
Stance on reformist participation: Supports
The Workers’ House of the Islamic Republic holds the license for Kar va Kargar and Esrafil Ebadati 
is the managing director. Iran’s official labor union and the Workers’ House were formed during the 
first years after the Islamic Revolution to prevent the formation of Marxist groups among Iranian 
workers. During the reformist era, this group took on a reformist identity, and did not accept the 
existence of independent workers’ syndicates. As such, their reformist tendencies do not extend to 
workers rights, but rather to centralizing control over them.
The newspaper supported Khatami in the 1997 and 2001 elections, Mostafa Moein in 2005, and 
Mousavi in 2009. However, following the post-election unrest, they ceased their support of Mousa-
vi, Karroubi and reformists in general. During the 2013 election, Kar va Kargar will likely support 
either the top reformist candidate, a candidate supported by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, or a 
critical-of-the-government conservative. This newspaper has very low readership, and maintains 
inconsistent publication. 
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Reformists
Bahar
Supported in 2009: Mir Hossein Mousavi.
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely support either a reformist or 
a conservative candidate critical of the government, 
such as Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. 
Stance on reformist participation: Supports. 
The license holder and the managing director of Bahar is Saeed Pour-Azizi, the director of the 
presidential media office during the term of former President Mohammad Khatami. Bahar is a 
reformist newspaper that experienced closures in 2000, 2003 and 2010. It resumed publication in 
November 2012. Bahar’s editorial board includes leading reformist activists Fereidoon Amoozadeh- 
Khalili, Khosro Talebzadeh, and Behrouz Geranpayeh.
Bahar is the closest newspaper to Mohammad Khatami, the reformist faction, the Mosharekat 
(Participation) Front, and Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization Party. Activities of 
these factions and parties have been greatly limited by the judiciary and officials at the Ministry of 
Interior since 2005.
The majority of reformists, including Khatami, have discussed their conditions for participation with 
Bahar, which include widening the political space, releasing political prisoners, ending the house 
arrests of Mousavi and Karroubi, and providing a safe and healthy space for competition in the next 
election.
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Etemaad
Supported in 2009: 
Was divided between Mir Hossein 
Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi
Expected to support in 2013: 
They will likely support either a reformist 
or a critical-of-the-government conservative candidate.
Stance on reformist participation: Supports.
Elias Hazrati, a well-known reformist figure, is the license holder and managing director of Etemaad. 
The paper was first launched in 2002, and has since been shut down twice. Hazrati supported 
Karroubi during the 2009 elections, but the majority of the newspaper’s journalists supported 
Mousavi.
After the election, Etemaad developed a conservative editorial line to avoid suppression. During 
recent months, however, Etemaad has been covering news and discussions circulating between 
reformists, traditional conservatives, and critical-of-the-government conservatives in an attempt to 
facilitate the return of reformists to Iran’s political scene.
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Shargh
Supported in 2009: 
They did not publicly support one candidate. 
Journalists on their staff, however, openly 
supported Mousavi and Karroubi.
Expected to support in 2013: Will likely 
support Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
Stance on reformist participation: Supports.
Mehdi Rahmanian is the license holder and managing director of Shargh which closed down four 
times since 2002. During its first period of publication, Shargh had close ties with Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani and his Kargozaran Sazandegi Party; however, it eventually developed a more neutral 
editorial line. During the 2009 election, the majority of journalists working with Shargh were either 
Mousavi or Karroubi supporters, but Shargh did not publicly support one particular candidate.
Shargh remains critical of the government. The erosion of relations between Ahmadinejad and 
Khamenei has given Shargh more flexibility to criticize the President and Mashaei.
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Conclusion
As presented in this report, during the lead up to the 2013 election, there is a more visible divide 
among conservatives compared to the 2009 election. This group is divided into three camps: 
pro-government conservatives, with their most influential newspaper as Iran; traditional conserva-
tives, maintain Resalat and Jam-e Jam as their strongest newspapers; and critical-of-the-govern-
ment conservatives use Hamshahri as their leading publication.
On the other hand, reformist newspapers largely changed their outlook after the 2009 elections. 
Out of fear of closure, papers such as Mardomsalari de-emphasized their support for 2009 reform-
ists such as Mousavi and Karroubi, but maintain positive associations towards candidates such as 
Rafsanjani. The best known and explicitly reformist newspapers are Bahar, Etemaad, and Shargh.
Iran’s political divisions are reflected within newspapers, especially in the period leading up to pres-
idential elections. In the absence of strong political parties, presidential candidates rely on newspa-
pers as a platform for campaigning and to convey their message and slogans to the population and 
the masses.
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